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Gendered social movements: A critical comparison of the 
suffrage and gay marriage movements
Michelle L Kelsey
Arizona State University
Michelle.Kelsey@asu.edu
The elections of 2008 saw the passage of several overwhelming and explicit 
condemnations of gay rights across the nation. Most damaging to the gay 
marriage movement was the successful passage of proposition 8 in California, 
the first time that the right to gay marriage was repealed. I argue that the 
continued modeling of the civil rights framework defers an analysis of 
the argumentative strategies of historically gendered movements such as 
the suffrage movement and is a disservice to the strategic potential of the 
marriage equality movement. The critical comparison made here between 
suffrage and marriage equality opens the potential for our foremothers to 
teach us to effectively counter gender stereotypes in the pursuit of national 
legislative equality. 
For decades, GLBT individuals and communities have forwarded a 
rights-based campaign seeking political, legislative, and social legitimacy 
and equality. While the priorities and goals of the GLBT movement(s) 
have changed and shifted over the course of its existence, few issues have 
dominated the political thought and thrust of gay and lesbian movements 
more than the freedom to marry. A 1993 Hawaiian Supreme Court decision 
mandated that the denial of civil marriage licenses to GLBT individuals 
ought to be considered sex discrimination; thus sparking a now 15 year old 
national campaign both to protect the “sanctity” of marriage, and to realize 
complete legislative freedom for gays and lesbians (Cox, 1994; Hovermill, 
1994; Keane, 1995; Kramer, 1997; Kersch, 1997).
The election of 2008 saw the passage of several overwhelming and 
explicit condemnations of gay rights across the nation. Most damaging to 
the gay marriage movement was the successful passing of proposition 8 in 
California that repealed the rights of gays and lesbians to legally marry in 
that state. The gay marriage movement in 2010 faces the same sorts of rights 
roll-back through legislative, judicial, and public proposition measures. In the 
face of this resistance and with the determination that marriage equality will 
be realized, it is imperative to evaluate the argumentative strategies of the gay 
marriage movement as they are articulated in public debate. One persuasive 
way in which the rhetorical productions of the gay marriage movement have 
proceeded is through the framework of the civil rights movement. 
Studies of the civil rights framework are useful and insightful, but they 
fall short in the way of explanatory power when it comes to specifically 
gender-based arguments forwarded by marriage equality opponents. 
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Considering this movement in relation to other particularly gendered 
movements reveals a meaningful similarity. The trajectory of the gay marriage 
movement is not unlike that of the women’s suffrage movement in the United 
States in the late 1800s continuing until the vote was realized in 1920. While 
temporally different, the gender specific strategies of the suffragists reflect 
in the same sex marriage debate. Any emulation as a strategic tool is worth 
investigation. It is the unique character of gender-based movements that 
justify the critical comparison made here. Few scholars have archived the 
similarities and differences between the same sex marriage movement and 
the suffrage movement, surely an endless project. As such, this paper seeks 
to understand the similarly gender-based problems faced by both movements 
in an attempt to mobilize both theoretical and practical tools to aid in a more 
nuanced development of contemporary contestations of gender expectations 
particularly in terms of appropriate gender performance for marriage. In an 
effort to do so, a review of the gay marriage movement is appropriate.
Literature Review
Initially, Smith (2000) illustrates that the primary arguments in the gay 
marriage debate surface in two ways. First, gay marriage advocates speak 
about the right to marriage and other rights as civil rights, or as a sanitized 
“bundle of right” (p. 23). Second, and alternatively, supporters opposed to 
same-sex marriage claim that marriage is “a valuable, indeed necessary, 
cultural form central to personal identity and social cohesion” (p. 23). In this 
way, marriage as a cultural icon trumps marriage as simply another civil right 
to which all are naturally entitled. The chasm between these two arguments 
is insurmountable and damaging to marriage equality advocates. Against 
the background of the traditional moralistic condition of marriage, a more 
hollowed argument about rights is not persuasive to overcome historical 
precedence. Nevertheless, there are few persuasive claims to make against 
the iconic nature of marriage in the United States that does not reject the 
institution altogether, a particularly precarious position for GLBT activists. 
Smith points out that there is implicit refutation in arguments for a traditional 
understanding of marriage, in so far as the exclusive nature of marriage rights 
is grounded in moralistic and theological foundations. In this way, anti-gay 
marriage activism limits the strategies available in answering their arguments 
while overwhelming a rights-based claim with religious tradition.
Furthermore, Smith (2000) indicates that the persuasive strategies of the 
anti-gay marriage supporters are fundamentally more persuasive because of 
the focus on the traditional nuclear family. He writes
advocates opposed to gay marriage condense their moral 
and cultural arguments into the figure of the “family” 
understood as the intact heterosexual, gender rigid, 
procreative family. Put simply, the only acceptable 
marriage is a “covenant established by God wherein 
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one man and one woman, united for life, are licensed by 
the state for the purpose of founding and maintaining a 
family. (p. 33)
Conclusions such as these work themselves into legislative and electoral 
discourse on marriage and produce the current pattern of political loss for 
the gay community.
Given this political loss, Smith (2000) offers some alternatives for 
same-sex marriage advocates to improve their discursive productions. He 
argues that to meet moralistic rhetoric one must engage in moralistic rhetoric. 
He suggests that instead of defending homosexuality by examining and 
refuting various objections to homosexuals’ relationships, GLBT people 
need to articulate strong arguments in favor of homosexual relationships. 
This moves the grounds of the debate to an offensive position for gay and 
lesbian activists. He further asserts that gay and lesbian activists must stop 
relying on rights-based rhetoric to advance their cause; instead they must 
begin a rhetoric of judgment and commitment that articulates what material 
conditions they are being deprived of and how cultural understanding can 
stop their oppression.
Smith’s (2000) suggestion of a ‘rhetoric of judgment and commitment’ 
is not radically opposed to Jacobs’ (1993) research indicating that victimage 
rhetoric may be the most effective mechanism for GLBT advocates to 
achieve marriage rights. Jacobs surveys in his article the three primary 
persuasive strategies of the gay marriage/gay rights movement: visibility 
rhetoric, scourge rhetoric, and victimage rhetoric. Initially, visibility rhetoric 
is “rhetoric that declared the existence of gays as a class to the polity” (p. 2). 
Jacobs argues that the first initiation of such rhetoric was in the aftermath of 
Stonewall. The riots helped to energize GLBT advocates across the country 
to engage in political association. The rhetoric that characterized this time 
in the movement was primarily comprised of slogans that were to function 
as persuasive appeals to create a movement. Those slogans included “say 
it loud, gay is proud”, “gay is good”, and “three, five, seven, nine, lesbians 
are mighty fine” (p. 4). These slogans were not only a way to bring the 
movement together, but also worked to help closeted GLBT persons feel 
comfortable coming out. 
Visibility rhetoric fizzled out by the 1970s when the rhetoric became 
obsolete due to coalesced social movements underway. The mid 1970s saw a 
wave of scourge rhetoric employed by the conservative right. The archetypal 
enemy of the gay marriage/gay rights movement during this time was Anita 
Bryant. Bryant was a former Miss Oklahoma with a singing career who 
was also deeply committed to her fundamentalist Baptist beliefs (Jacobs, 
p. 32). One element of her particular belief system was the conviction 
that homosexuality was wrong, biblically condemned, and an evil to be 
legally criminalized. As such, Bryant dedicated herself to opposing gay 
rights ordinances all over the country. She is most widely known for her 
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opposition to a Dade County, Florida ordinance that would have prohibited 
discrimination against GLBT persons in housing and other sectors (p. 33). Her 
and other conservative uses of scourge rhetoric took the form of arguments 
best epitomized by her statement, “why does such an abomination to God 
as homosexuality exist? It’s Satan on the move” (p. 34). 
Scourge rhetoric, at its heart, was moral, medical, and debasing rhetoric 
with the specific purpose of demonizing homosexuals. More specifically, 
the religious right used tactics that located homosexuals as villains intent 
on corrupting the American moral system. Bryant and her colleagues 
used strategies that cast homosexuals as child molesters at worst; at best, 
homosexuals were attempting to recruit young children to their ranks due 
to inability to procreate naturally. Furthermore, Bryant’s claims that she 
and others must save their children from the moral depravity that was 
homosexuality resonated strongly to an audience that had grown tired of the 
radical movements of the 1960s. According to Jacobs (1993), over 72% of 
Americans reported their disapproval of homosexuality directly following the 
assault of scourge rhetoric intermittent through out referendum campaigns. 
This strategy is exceedingly effective for anti-gay advocates because it is a 
direct answer to visibility rhetoric and the mantras the 1960s. The argument 
that gay is bad, a moral disease, and homosexuals want to recruit children 
overwhelms rapidly the argument “gay is good”. 
The gay marriage/rights debate alternative here is to answer the 
arguments in largely religious terms. The movement at the time was not 
well equipped to do so. In this case, the gay rights movement maintained 
the ‘gay is good’ arguments. In an attempt to counter the recruiting and child 
molestation charges, the gay rights movement responded that it was unfair to 
let gay children believe that they are alone or evil. Unfortunately making the 
move rhetorically to address childhood sexuality was the wrong one. For a 
culture that already believes that sex talk is taboo, focusing on the sexuality 
of children reinforced the stereotypes of homosexuals recruiting and turning 
children into homosexuals. This strategy set back the movement at least five 
years according to Jacobs (p. 39).
In the 1980s the gay rights movement experienced an unlikely opening 
through which they could gain a substantial amount of ground they had lost 
in the 1970s. The Reagan administration published a surprising report that 
indicated that GLBT people experienced more hate crimes than African 
Americans, Jews, and Hispanics combined. The news media surrounding 
presidential reports not only increased the visibility of homosexuals, but also 
garnered the movement sympathy across the nation (Jacobs, p. 42). Not only 
was the report released from one of the least gay friendly presidents in the 
recent past, the report allowed the gay rights group to frame arguments in 
an entirely new manner. Jacobs argues that because GLBT identified people 
were experiencing physical crime that was recognized nationally, they could 
now articulate arguments in terms of tolerance instead of acceptance. Instead 
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of asking the American public to accept them, they could ask the American 
public to protect their basic right to safety that would get their foot in the 
door for further legal reform. Jacobs argues that this by far was the most 
successful persuasive strategy of the gay rights movement. 
Given the success of victim rhetoric, it is Jacobs’ conclusion that the 
movement employs more of this rhetoric in the fight for equality. Jacobs 
(1993) contends that as homosexuals continue to secure minor rights to 
material safety they are increasing the legal acceptance of homosexuals as 
equal citizens. When homosexuals are recognized as equal citizens, denying 
them civil rights is less plausible. Furthermore, Jacobs argues that the GLBT 
movement must narrow their arguments into more nuanced positions with 
multiple options for articulation. Jacobs points out that the more nuanced 
the argument the more persuasive, and the more difficult it will be for the 
anti-gay activists to answer without having to spend time defending their 
own position.
Jacobs (1993) is one of many authors that advocate that the gay marriage 
movement/gay rights movement develop more nuanced, precise arguments 
to attempt to answer those forwarded by the opposition but also to generate 
offensive arguments that advance them in the debate. Smith and Windes 
(1997) explain that there are multiple sites of struggle in the debate over gay 
marriage. These sites are troubling because they demand each side address a 
number of issues and arguments simultaneously while finding innovative and 
specific answers. There are five arguments identified by Smith and Windes 
that warrant analysis. The first is the debate over a “culture war” (p. 37). The 
anti-gay marriage movement has the advantage when defining the gay marriage 
struggle as a culture war. Arguments in favor of gay marriage are minor and 
largely negative in this context. Those who oppose marriage equality or gay 
rights more generally maintain the debate as a culture war wherein gay and 
lesbian activists wage war on mainstream culture forcing the average citizen to 
accept their ‘perversion’. In this way, gay and lesbian claims to equality were 
not palatable against a fear of societal disaccord and depravity. 
The argument against same-sex marriage here is that homosexual 
advocacy is by its nature an attack on culture. Homosexuals are subversive 
and deserve to be marginalized in this view. This exploits for persuasive 
purposes the already marginalized status of GLBT people. It reinforces and 
reminds the listeners that GLBT people are already not equal in the status 
quo for a reason. Ultimately, culture is a contested ground in the antigay 
debate but not in the marriage equality debate. Smith and Windes (1997) 
argue that this differential is a partial explanation as to why gay marriage 
advocates continue to lose debates; behind because of their marginalized 
status, gay marriage advocates are not adequately addressing the arguments 
forwarded by their opponents. 
The next argument articulated by Smith and Windes (1997) that appears 
in the gay marriage debate is “totalitarianism” (p. 37). Both sides of the 
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gay marriage debate accuse each other of being Nazis. Marriage equality 
advocates argue that those opposed to same-sex marriage are Nazis because 
they demand no deviations from the norm, and expect a blind following. 
Anti-gay advocates point to homosexuals as an integral part of the Nazi 
party and often brand them with pink swastikas. Overall, the deployment 
of the term Nazi immediately calls into question legitimate state power. 
This argument fundamentally questions the level to which the government 
can be manipulated to promote the interest of the minority. As a result the 
argument for free expression was developed by gay marriage activists. 
Shortly after, the anti-gay advocates co-opted the argument stating that they 
have the constitutional right to freedom of religious expression which we 
as Americans have decided is more persuasive than rights-based claims of 
free expression.
The third type of argument discussed by Smith and Windes (1997) is 
“ideograph rights” (p. 37). According to the authors, “the pro-gay movement 
labels their demands as ‘gay rights’” because it would be understood to 
include legal protection against discrimination (p. 38). The antigay movement 
labels these rights “special rights” that infringe on majority rights. Further, 
they argue that homosexual behavior implicitly disqualifies claims to legal 
protection and does not deserve freedom. The equivocation here is murder or 
rape; as perverted acts, they do not deserve protection under the law (p. 38). 
Despite the failure of civil rights discourse in the case of the gay rights 
movement, Smith and Windes (2000) suggest that within this argument 
rights-based claims have the most potential to be successful because the 
arguments would echo the civil rights movement rhetoric that was successful. 
Alternatively, they argue that those opposed to gay rights in this context are 
likely to be successful as well. Anti-gay rights arguments are persuasive 
because they can emphasize equality (no special rights) and counter one 
set of rights claims with another. These persuasive appeals in contemporary 
debate would be reminiscent of the affirmative action debates, quotas, and 
reverse racism. It appears, then, that the most persuasive strategies still lie 
on the side of the anti-gay marriage debate.
In addition to rights claims, both sides of the gay marriage debate 
also attempt to cast themselves as anti-establishment. Anti-establishment 
claims, according Smith and Windes (2000), should ideally aid gay 
marriage advocates, as they are in fact the numeric minority in the debate. 
Unfortunately, however, the anti-gay marriage activists win here as well. 
Specifically, arguments in favor of gay rights include attempts to “modify a 
society dominated by capitalism, patriarchy, heterosexism, homophobia, and 
religiosity,” (p. 40). As one of these ideologies is identified as problematic, 
dominant, or oppressive it demands a fundamental restructuring of that 
system. Alternatively, argument against same-sex marriage make clear that 
they are fighting against “the establishment, dominated by elite secular 
humanists” who they claim have control over television, journalism, print 
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media, and other forms of cultural communication (p. 40). Both groups 
attempt to create the other as the establishment and direct their persuasive 
strategies in that way. Given historical and contemporary stereotypes of 
homosexuals, the ability of the antigay marriage side to cast homosexuals 
as trying to invade their culture and recruit people to their ranks resonates 
particularly strongly with average Americans. So, despite the fact that 
approximately 5% of the population in American is likely gay they are seen 
as aggressively in control. To find this argument in public debates, one need 
look no further than September 2009, when a Republican senator from Iowa 
claimed on the Rush Limbaugh show that gay and lesbian activists have 
“bought off the media, and congressional representatives” to enforce and 
protect a “gay agenda”.
Most contemporary gay marriage supporters are at a stand still in terms 
of negotiating a public discourse surrounding the issue. While many states 
have passed then overturned, and then passed again GLBT rights to marriage 
there is no national recognition of or protection for state recognized same 
sex marriage or civil unions. My attempt in this paper is not to deny the 
important progress made in the way of securing marriage rights for GLBT 
individuals, or to ignore the work of activists in this fight. My hope in 
exploring this literature and drawing the comparisons between particularly 
gendered movements is to find a way for GLBT activists and individuals to 
articulate more accurately responsive claims against aggressively traditional 
gender-biased arguments. As is illustrated above, those interested in the 
arguments made by the gay marriage and anti-gay marriage movements 
have not explored the gendered questions that are necessary to answer before 
either side is on the same ground. To find this common ground and to begin 
the analysis of these two movements, a turn to the structure and operation 
of the suffrage movement arguments is necessary.
Framework
Aileen Kraditor (1965) categorizes types of arguments made in the 
suffrage movement in terms of their content, and implication for the 
movement. She outlines two primary argument types: arguments from justice 
and arguments from expediency. Arguments from justice demand the right 
to suffrage based on women’s shared humanity with men. Because men 
and women are both citizens and share the right to natural rights protection, 
arguments from justice say women should have the natural right to vote. 
Kraditor explains that arguments from expediency negotiate the 
meaning of rights, or rights-based claims. Arguments from expediency 
require that the arguer make offensive claims in demand for rights that in so 
doing also describe the way in which the attainment of those rights would 
improve society. In this way, women made arguments from expediency 
that indicated the kinds of change that their vote could affect. For example, 
Elizabeth Cady Stanton in a speech delivered in 1904 argued that women 
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should have the right to vote because their vote could reform the nature 
of corrupt, overzealous male politicians that were selfishly controlling the 
polity (Kraditor, p. 47-48). 
Kraditor (1965) indicates that the early demands of the suffrage 
movement were primarily characterized by arguments from justice (p. 
44). This is consistent with the history of early America. A relatively new 
America was forged based on individual freedom, natural rights, and civic 
participation. Under the tide of this political freedom, claims to natural 
rights and a common humanity played into the genre of arguments made by 
the founders of new male freedom. Women in many states originally had 
the right to vote, and those rights were slowly but steadily being repealed. 
Demands for equality on the grounds of natural rights, then, in the face of 
rights depravation seemed the most persuasive. This strategy changed at the 
turn of the 20th Century after all women in all states were deprived the right 
to vote. The question of why this change occurred seems irresolvable in the 
literature; however, a common explanation indicates that the introduction, 
or at least the increased concern about race issues as they intersected with 
women’s suffrage, changed the way that white women in particular articulated 
socially imperative reasons why they should have the right to vote (Kraditor, 
p. 52-53). 
Because there was overwhelming fear that suffrage granted to women 
would mean suffrage for African American women as well, white women at 
the time changed their strategy to increase the distinction between themselves 
and African American women. This strategy initiated claims of citizenship, 
productivity, and public morality. Because white women were responsible 
for the moral rearing of young congressmen, they claimed they needed the 
right to vote. This argument from expediency illustrates how women had to 
articulate arguments and characterizations of how the vote granted to women 
would positively impact social mores and relationships.
These two nuanced distinctions will be used as a framework for 
evaluating the political and social viability of the gender based arguments 
forwarded by both the suffrage movement as well as the gay marriage 
movement. This however is not enough to articulate just how similar or 
different arguments forwarded both for and against each movement truly 
were and what the implications of those similarities or differences may be 
for the gay marriage movement. Karlyn Kohrs Campbell (1989) illustrates 
three primary arguments forwarded against suffragists during the movement: 
theology, biology, and sociology (p. 37). Theological arguments were the 
most fundamental to the suffrage arguments in as much as they indicted the 
appropriate, moral character of women. The argument was that God has a 
distinctive plan and place for women in the home to maintain the family 
unit (Campbell, p. 37). Deviations from this plan were not only sins, but 
ultimately immoral. As such, the performance of femininity in this context 
became a moral imperative. The second set of arguments forwarded against 
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suffragists was arguments from biology. These arguments were constructed 
on biological differences between the sexes assuming male superiority. So 
the argument looked something like: women had smaller brains and as such 
were the weaker sex and not fit for the responsibilities of voting. This line 
of argumentation further reasoned that women by virtue of their femaleness 
were naturally conditioned to be subservient, passive, and caretakers. The 
last argument made against suffragists was from sociology. Sociological 
arguments were predicated on the notion that women were part of a distinct 
social group, the family, and their job was to maintain that social unit. 
All three arguments are interconnected; as such, the arguments grow 
slightly more complicated than the examples given above. It is because of 
the nuanced nature of how gender-based arguments can be made and justified 
that this framework for comparisons between the suffrage movement and the 
gay marriage movement is necessary. Few arguments in the public sphere are 
rooted so thoroughly in tradition, intolerance, and ignorance than questions 
of gender and expected and appropriate gender performance for both men 
and women. 
Analysis
What follows is an analysis of the arguments articulated against the 
suffrage movements and their relationship to the arguments forwarded against 
marriage equality, each movements responses, followed by a close reading 
of the important differences between the movements. The structure reflects 
both Kraditor’s (1965) argumentative priorities as well as Campbell’s (1989) 
organization of content-based arguments.
Oppositional Arguments from Expediency
Biological/Theological. Foundational to the opposition of suffrage 
was the indictment on biological terms that women are by nature inferior 
to men. While this is fundamentally a biological argument, it is inextricable 
in this case from theological arguments concerning the appropriate role 
of women. Men and women opposed to suffrage were aggressive and 
successful at characterizing women as “rejecting their feminine nature, 
being freaks, counterfeit men, monstrosities of nature, unsexed and 
oversexed simultaneously, self-absorbed, and belittling the hard work of 
other domestic women” (Marshall, 1997, p. 132). Naturally, these arguments 
were contextualized in relation to men and masculinity in so far as the 
rejection of femininity directly threatened male masculinity. Women, at 
the divestiture of their femininity, transformed marriage from a religious 
sacrament to a partnership between two equals (Marshall, p. 138). This 
equalization of marriage participants crowds out male responsibility for 
familial care. Deposition of male power as head of the household ignites 
threats of male reversion to barbarianism and a regression from chivalry 
(discussed in detail below). This indictment of women and who they become 
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through activism and ultimately their right to vote is the core of the anti-
suffrage movement strategies. Marshall indicates that these arguments were 
typically contextualized to specific situations, but indictments of a woman’s 
true femininity were almost always cast in terms of how the traditional role 
of men was displaced (p. 138). Taking this argument a step further, and 
turning to theological justification, many argued that the natural condition of 
women is subservience demonstrated in the Christian origin story of Adam 
and Eve, and well as countless other social positions of women articulated in 
biblical narratives. This positions anti-suffragists to argue that the rejection 
of femininity is unnatural through biblical condemnation.
Mismatched gender performances as a threat to traditionally understood 
roles in both marriage and the family is not lost in the gay marriage debates. In 
fact, GLBT individuals struggle most in shoring up support for gay marriage 
because of the strategies used by those opposed to gay marriage to characterize 
all GLBT individuals as gender confused and clinically so. Those opposed to 
marriage equality argue that both gay men and lesbians enact, in extremes, 
gender oppositional performances. Both gay men and lesbians are cast in 
incongruent stereotypes of GLBT individuals and women simultaneously. 
Specifically, gay men are cast in two opposing ways in the gay marriage 
debate. As discussed previously, gay men are most often characterized as 
hypermasculine, aggressors, savage, hedonistic, and predatory. When that 
stereotype does not fit the situation, gay men are otherwise stereotyped 
feminine, or overly effeminate. Here, they simply become women (Herman, 
1997, p. 80). Alternatively, lesbians are either hypermasculine or they are 
victims. Lesbians first get defined as attempting to be men. In this sense, 
they also become aggressors, dangerous, and unnatural. They dress like, act 
like, and sound like men (Herman, p. 94). 
If lesbians are not attempting to be men, according to those opposed to 
gay marriage, their homosexuality can be attributed to emotional and sexual 
abuse and imbalance. Marshall (1997) indicates that anti-gay marriage 
advocates believe that lesbians are such because men have molested them, 
or their mothers have molested them, or gay men have corrupted them, or 
there was not a fulfillment of maternal needs while they were children. 
The strategic positioning of lesbians in this context is not incidental; in any 
case, women are not agents except when they are failing mothers. Men are 
characterized as predatory, both gay and straight. This reinforcement of 
traditional gender roles undercuts the viability of lesbians to make credible 
arguments in the gay marriage debate. This too is not an accident, as both 
Herman (1997) and Sullivan articulate, lesbians may be the biggest asset 
to the movement. Sullivan uses lesbian commitment, monogamy, and child 
rearing, as examples of how gay and lesbian relationships can be both healthy 
and non-threatening to heterosexual relationships. Herman indicates that 
opposition to lesbianism is relatively benign and as such lesbians could be a 
powerful political asset in arguments for gay marriage/rights (p. 108). Both 
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of these arguments, however, generate their own set of gendered assumptions 
that will be addressed in the implications section below.
Sociological. Initially, anti-suffragists labeled those in support of the 
right to vote “aggressors.” Primarily, these women were characterized as 
preying on a democratic society. This argument accused women of demanding 
“extra rights” as citizens of the United States (Marshall, 1997, p. 98). Suffrage 
here is illustrated as an aggressive campaign imposed upon the polity by a 
select few women who lost their sense of place in the social order. A pamphlet 
released in California following a significant victory for suffrage headlined: 
“Should all women bear the burden of the ballot to give some women political 
prominence?” (Marshall, p. 98-99). While an explicit extra rights claim here 
is apparent, it is the enthymematic power of this argument that ultimately 
gives it weight. What is not said in this argument but is implicitly inferred is 
that women would be burdened by the extra responsibility of having a voice 
in their political and social lives, which seems to necessarily imply their 
weakness. Further, it implies the elitism of a few women over the greater 
good of society. This description is powerful in as much as it negates the 
nature of being a proper woman. The attributes of true womanhood (later 
termed the Cult of True Womanhood) demand that women be pious, pure, 
generous, domestic, dependent, submissive, as well as giving, and selfless in 
deference to the needs of her family (Welter, 1977). Any violation of these 
values violated gendered norms and performance expectations. The claim 
that women in the movement were elitist and demanding “special rights” was 
more than just a reflection of modern day anti-affirmative action arguments, 
but instead was an unspoken assault on the femininity and womanhood of 
suffragists.
In much the same vein, opponents of same sex marriage use the same 
label of “aggressor” and while some of the implications of this label are 
the same as the suffrage movement, some are distinctly and devastatingly 
different. An aggressor in its most benign sense in the gay marriage debate 
characterizes GLBT individuals as desiring extra rights or special rights. 
This argument is not uncommon as illustrated by the suffrage movement, 
the civil rights movement, and in any debates concerning affirmative 
action (Herman, p. 76). This claim to special rights, though, is wrapped 
up in the rhetorical power of the term “aggressor” when it comes to GLBT 
individuals. Historically, according to Herman, gay men in particular have 
been characterized as “hyper-masculinity out of control, aggressive, powerful, 
unrestrained, and predatory” despite the common assumption that gay 
men are gendered effeminate (p. 79-80). Specifically, gay men are not just 
predators of other gay men, they are particularly threatening to straight men, 
and young boys as well (Sullivan, 2007). In this context, gay men become 
predators of people not just ideologies, or democracy as was the case for 
suffragists. More importantly perhaps for the gender analysis here, they 
become predators of masculinity. Gay men are in a perpetual state of non-
106
masculinity. Either they are hyper-masculinzed as illustrated above, or, they 
are feminized to the point that their masculinity is unrecognizable (Herman, 
p. 80-81). This strategic juxtaposition makes the attainment of masculinity 
impossible while also maintaining a “healthy” view of masculinity that is free 
from any threat or implication of homosexuality. In this sense then, the gay 
male as aggressor is not just about rights-based due, or material predatory 
concerns, but also about the protection of masculinity and the appropriate 
performance thereof. 
An additional content-based argument forwarded by anti-suffragists was 
women as radicals. This is intimately connected to women as predators in 
the sense that females were characterized as being associated with evil and 
dangerous sources (Marshall, p. 100). The strategy of this label was to associate 
activist women with groups of people that were decidedly threatening to socials 
mores, the democratic process, or threatened the power of the country such 
as socialists, anarchists, atheists, and radical labor movements (p. 100). This 
enabled anti-suffragists to generate a public sentiment against suffragists based 
on no facts, but instead to depend on already established fears of political and 
social instability due to external forces. These ideological associations between 
suffragists and socialists, atheists, etc. also functioned to insult the femininity 
of the women participating in the suffrage movements. Campbell (1989) 
explains that if women were to meet the minimum requirements of being a 
true woman, they have to be submissive to their husbands (imitation of men), 
as well as be the spiritual mainstay of the family. If suffragists are associated 
with external evil forces such as atheists and other radical groups they are 
presumably not deferring to their husbands moderate or conservative views. 
Equally important is the rejection of religion, and the democratic process. If 
suffragists were willing to associate with socialists and atheists, it calls into 
question the capacity for those women to be the feminine mothers to which 
their gender is obligated.
GLBT individuals are not strangers to the ‘radical’ label. Specifically in 
gay marriage debates radical has become a euphemism for Nazi (Herman, 
p. 90-91). Herman explains that gay marriage supporters were labeled 
radicals (Nazis) to characterize the movement as power hungry totalitarians 
forcing their homosexuality onto mainstream culture. This picture of GLBT 
individuals, it is worth noting, is incongruent with the anarchic savages 
in arguments that depict gay men as aggressors. Of course, however, the 
hyper-masculinity is emulated in the militaristic metaphor associated 
with totalitarianism. This rhetorical strategy is mutually reinforcing. It 
associates Nazis with GLBT individuals signifying the foundationally 
corrupt and diseased ideas of Nazism while simultaneously signifying 
GLBT individuals with a historically saturated view of conquest and world 
domination (Herman, p. 91). This rhetorical move does a little more than 
just associate the gay marriage movement with totalitarian Nazism; the 
choice to hail the Holocaust in relation to GLBT individuals is powerful 
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in erasing historical memory of the gay men and lesbians that were also 
systematically killed in concentration camps by virtue of their sexuality. 
Herman does not acknowledge this particular problem with calling on the 
Nazi descriptor; however, there is little arguing that associating GLBT 
individuals with Nazis does cultural work to highlight the differences 
that were the grounds for the extermination of GLBT individuals during 
the Holocaust. In this way, mainstream culture can fight Nazis or GLBT 
individuals; in either case, gay marriage activists lose.
For the suffrage movement, moving away from abstract labels such as 
aggressor or Nazi was a social imperative to articulate an immediate threat 
from suffragists. Anti-suffragists sought to paint women as irresponsible, 
dangerous, and bad mothers by indicting their commitment to the family. The 
argument that women were ignoring their responsibility to the family was 
both persuasive and gendered. Marshall (1997) argues that anti-suffragists’ 
arguments concerning the family attacked the presumed division of labor: 
“men protect women and the family on the battlefield and in politics, while 
women preserve the family at home” (Marshall, p. 109). The act of seeking 
suffrage itself withdrew the woman from her appropriate place in the home, 
it was argued, and any successful result of the movement would cement 
such a condition. Anti-suffragists argued that the right to vote would move 
women out of the home and into the corrupt location of social and political 
debates (Claflin, 1871). Suffragists faced a litany of attacks in this respect 
including: “starting sex wars, marital discord, domestic neglect, rampant 
individualism, disunity, rivalry, and strife” (Marshall, p. 121). 
While the argument that women moving out of their domestic position 
would undermine the family is gendered, a more in-depth understanding 
of how women and men were strategically positioned in these arguments 
reveals that the primary concern was the risk the movement posed to role 
of men and masculinity. Campbell illustrates the arguments were typically 
characterized by male power. The family was likened to the state, and the 
man as the head of his own government. For women to break out of their 
domesticity men would have to surrender their leadership of the family state 
to women. Women alternatively were characterized in this context as overtly 
aggressive and power hungry to dominate men and the family (Campbell, 
p. 157). Furthermore, suffragists as responsible for sex wars hailed both a 
metaphor for violence, but also a serious threat of material violence. Marshall 
indicates that in this argument men and women opposed to suffrage argued 
that female dominance would lead to a regression from chivalry and into a 
sort of barbarianism. Men argued “we have put women on a pedestal… they 
will fall” (Marshall, p. 123). This argument culminated in a threat that the 
sight of women voting would excite the sexual brutality of men leading to 
uncontrollable rape and assault. 
While threats of physical violence and their realization have often been 
the subtext of many arguments concerning the equalizing of power relations, 
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(see civil rights movement, Chicano rights movement, feminist movements, 
etc.) these arguments are particularly underscored in the context of gender-
based arguments (Marshall, p. 123). Threats and actualized violence continue 
to be an undercurrent in the debate over same-sex marriage particularly 
when it comes to the corruption of the family by gay marriage. The most 
predominate argument from those who oppose marriage equality is borne 
out of the notion that marriage is for procreation. At the most fundamental 
level, GLBT individuals threaten the family because two same sex partners 
cannot naturally produce a family (Rauch, 1996). 
This is not where “the assault on the family” argument ends. Sullivan 
illustrates that GLBT individuals are also characterized as emotionally 
inept, promiscuous, and lack the restraint to be monogamous. These 
qualities, as per traditionalists, are a basic requirement for healthy families. 
It is important to note that lesbians endure far less scrutiny in terms of 
family based arguments. ‘Lesbians as mothers’ does not necessarily violate 
traditional female gender roles: women are meant to care for children. As 
such, the Christian Right defers to the public/private distinction when it 
comes to the question of lesbian mothers (Herman, p. 107-108). Mothering 
and other issues of domesticity have historically been secluded to the 
private realm, while issues such as political rights are considered public 
realm issues. This separation has strategically marginalized important issues 
surrounding female security and rights in the home. Issues like marital 
rape, domestic abuse and the like have been chalked up to private issues 
to be negotiated by the family. The position this puts lesbians in, then, is 
of invisibility in the debate. This nuanced distinction between assumed 
parenting desires and capabilities not only highlights inconsistencies in 
the anti-gay marriage movement but also spotlights the gendered nature 
of many of their arguments. The reversion back to a public/private 
dichotomy has additional implications that are given greater attention in 
detail below. 
Movement answers
As illustrated to this point, the suffragists and marriage equality 
advocates endured similar onslaughts of arguments that sought/seek to 
characterize activists as dangerous, unnatural, and risky social actors that 
threaten the normal functioning of the polity. While it is imperative to 
understand thoroughly the sorts and substance of arguments articulated 
against each of these movements, another key element in any discussion 
of social movements and their effectiveness is an understanding of the 
movements’ responses to accusations. Just as there was overwhelming overlap 
in the way of arguments made against each movement, their responses and/
or potential responses are equally similar. 
Argument from Justice. Suffragists claimed that they deserved equal 
rights due to the natural rights guaranteed them as humans. They reasoned 
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that if men and women share humanity and natural rights, then women 
too should have the right to vote secured. Though this strategy grows less 
effective in the gay marriage debate, those that support marriage equality 
make arguments from justice by mobilizing historical civil rights fights for 
equality including miscegenation, and desegregation. In the proposition 8 
debate in California, many “no on 8” commercials sought to couch their 
arguments for gay marriage in the images, rhetoric, and history of a civil 
rights movement that made primarily arguments from justice. To recognize 
the common humanity of those who are gay and those who are not is to 
recognize that equal rights is a cultural/democratic imperative. 
Arguments from Expedience
The turn to making offensive claims about the social utility of the 
right to vote or the right to marry complicates the grounds from which 
arguments are articulated and the strategic utility of some arguments. Both 
movements are put in a double-bind from their social/political locations in 
a democratic society. They are socially positioned outside of mainstream 
culture so must both criticize that culture and seek its entrance. In this 
way, the movement activists in both cases attack the people that must act 
for their liberation. 
Biological/Theological. As the turn of the century passed suffragists 
began a new wave of expedience arguments that capitalized on the xenophobia 
and religious intolerance of the time arguing that if women were given the 
vote it would offset the vote of foreigners and Catholics (Kraditor, p. 55). In 
this sense then, the assumption of the female vote was that it would emulate 
the vote of their husbands or the interests of common public morality that 
was presumably differentiated from that of foreigners or Catholics. This 
continues an implicit subservience to male power and opinion (Kraditor, 
p. 56). Generally, arguments from expedience, in the case of suffrage, meant 
the reinforcement of traditional gendered stereotypes of women in an effort 
to increase their freedom.
Sociological. Female ties to domesticity and the home created the 
conditions under which the women of the suffrage movement made 
arguments that capitalized on stereotypes while also advancing their rights. 
For example, women argued that they needed the right to vote because they 
were responsible for the training of young men who would later become 
statesmen and as such need the right to influence, politically, the home and 
men. On a macro level, this argument was that if women were responsible 
for the raising of statesmen, then they were also responsible for any failings 
of the state and as such should have the right to vote (Kraditor, p. 52). While 
this argument puts women in the position to bear the responsibility of a failed 
political system, it is also an effective offensive argument for suffrage.
Just as suffragists were dependent on their marginalized status to make 
arguments, GLBT individuals are also strapped to their position in the social 
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hierarchy. One argument from expediency indicates that gay marriage will 
help to domesticate gay male promiscuity (Bruce, 2004). According to Bruce, 
many argue that gay men are disease spreading hyper-sexed polygamous 
individuals who pose a threat to society as such. His proposition, then, is 
that marriage may be a sufficient solution to this particular social threat. He 
also indicates that it would do well for gay men and lesbians if the picture 
of homosexuality was not one of mass promiscuity and hyper-sexed men. 
This argument of course is only possible because the initial stereotype of 
the oversexed, diseased gay male exists. Furthermore, this argument asks 
gay people to emulate straight relationships. The assumption that women 
domesticate men is predicated on traditional gender roles, that is clear; 
however, the suggestion that gay men must or should be domesticated is 
both gendered and homophobic and implies that gay relationships should 
look and operate very much like straight relationships.
This strategy is particularly clear in the campaign initiated by the Human 
Rights Commission (HRC) generally titled “Family Matters” is the perfect 
exemplification of this construction. Only recently dubbed “Family Matters,” 
the campaign material spans over 12 years of the fight for gay marriage (hrc.
org). The campaign seeks to secure equal marriage benefits for civil unions. 
The front of the brochure features two prominent pictures of families. A 
family with two male parents with two children, as well as a family with two 
female parents with one child is the dominating force of the brochure under a 
bolded statement “OUR FAMILIES MATTER” (“Family Matters”, p. 1). The 
text of the front of the advertisement argues for same-sex marriage benefits 
for these families indicating their inability to access medical benefits for 
their children, collect veterans’ family benefits, or family and medical leave 
absences from their workplaces. This particular focus constructs <family> in 
mirror image to the heterosexual construction of family replacing opposite 
sexed partners with same sexed partners. The second page of the brochure is 
lined at the bottom with photos of presumably gay and lesbian parents with 
their children. These pictures only “read” gay because they appear in this 
publication. If featured anywhere else, they would be indiscernible in terms 
of sexuality. In this way, the argument positions gays and lesbians as “all 
but heterosexual”—reinforcing their difference in an effort to gain access 
to a mainstream institution.
An additional argument from expediency forwarded by the same sex 
marriage movement is that lesbian relationships currently prove that same 
sex relationships can function healthily as well as be monogamous. Flaks, 
et al. (1995) reasoned that lesbian relationships are more often than not 
characterized by “fidelity, responsibility, devotion, and a commitment to child 
rearing” (p. 34). There are few if any statistics to make such a qualitative and 
quantitative judgment of lesbian relationships. However, given contemporary 
stereotypes about lesbians and women in particular, it seems safe to assume 
that a household comprised of two women would operate predominately in a 
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stereotypical feminine paradigm and as such childrearing and the like would 
be true. The HRC again exemplifies this particular strategy one their website 
(hrc.org) when discussing the benefits of civil unions. They feature the 
story of the Andermills from Columbus, Ohio. Wrapped in Midwest values, 
Dorie and Karen Andermill tell their story of becoming a loving nurturing 
family. Their narrative is an exemplary model of a lesbian relationship. 
While they have no children, they are both public service workers: a special 
needs school teacher and an American Red Cross employee. Their 12-year 
relationship represents a high functioning relationship on par with those of 
heterosexuals, but is cloaked in the rhetoric of heteronormativity, subbing 
a husband for a wife.
Ultimately, the position from which each movement can craft responses 
to their opponents has thus far been in part foundationally reinforcing of 
gendered stereotypes that contribute to their initial oppression. For women, 
the demand and success of the suffrage movement can be attributed to 
arguments that at once sought to advance the political power of women 
but rests on social stereotypes of women. Similarly, the promotion of gay 
marriage in national debates seems to be predicated on an emulation of 
traditional heteronormative relationships—the basic components of which 
gay and lesbian relationships cannot meet, and the ideological condition that 
contributes to their oppression. 
Notable Divergences
Overall, it is clear both from the arguments made against each movement 
and their answers that these two movements share at their core arguments 
from disadvantaged gendered positions. These similarities are exceptionally 
important to acknowledge and understand; however, it is also in their 
differences that important distinctions are found that impact the ability of 
those in the gay marriage movement to borrow strategies from the suffrage 
movement in the way of answering gendered indictments. Three primary 
differences are relevant to the critical comparison made here: social positions, 
agency, and nuance.
Initially, it is important to note that women as a social group at the time 
of suffrage had a higher or at least a more solidified role in the social world. 
Women’s necessity as a part of a moral and social order was not questioned. 
Women were necessary because they maintained the family, they took care 
of their husbands, they trained future statesmen, and they were the moral 
compasses of a community. Gays and lesbians do not enjoy the same or even 
similar social positioning. There is no presumed natural role for members of 
the GLBT community in a society focused on productivity (both biologically 
and materially). GLBT individuals cannot presume to make arguments that are 
predicated on social utility. Their identity as individuals and as a movement 
strips them of any social leverage that natural arguments (arguments from 
expediency) require. This difference then, is an essential one. If members 
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of the gay marriage movement seek to emulate gender-based responses it 
is imperative that they find a social and political foundation where a basic 
value is presumed—outside of justice based claims.
The second important difference between these two movements found 
throughout the literature is the direction of agency within each movement. 
As is evident in many of the arguments made above, in the suffrage debate 
few arguments were made about how women would corrupt the structure of 
the voting system or the government; instead, arguments were predominately 
made that participation in that system would corrupt women. Women, here, 
are the victims of corruption. However, in the case of the gay marriage debate, 
members of the GLBT community are characterized as undermining the 
institution of marriage. This argument seeks to characterize GLBT individuals 
as predators as explained previously in my analysis. This dichotomy however, 
highlights the double duty that is required of GLBT individuals in debates 
concerning gay marriage. They must first defend their identity in the face 
of homophobic claims about the personal behaviors of gays and lesbians, 
and then can begin a reasonable discussion of marriage to prove that they 
would not corrupt the institution itself. This puts gays and lesbians behind 
before they even start the debate. 
The final difference to be discussed here is that while both movements are 
significantly and almost completely characterized by strict gender stereotypes 
and assumptions, it seems that the arguments articulated against gay men 
and lesbians in the way of gender are more nuanced and complicated. This 
does not eliminate the capacity for GLBT individuals to borrow answers or 
strategies from the suffrage movement, but it does complicate the nature 
of those arguments and their viability as legitimate responses to the unique 
gendered position of GLBT people. The double-bind that gay men face 
means that either way they perform gender they are not normal men. Either 
they are masculinity out of control, or they are drained of masculinity all 
together. They are not able to represent, in terms of oppositional arguments, 
normal male behavior. 
Lesbians face a further gender predicament. Their intersectional identities 
forsake them as political actors. Given the characterization of lesbians as 
victims, and women as victims they are divested of nearly all personal agency. 
Violence or persuasion happens to them to make them homosexual, and by 
nature of being women they are made to be powerless, and dependent upon 
men. This double-bind in both cases disadvantages both sexes and GLBT 
individuals generally because they never begin debates on any level foundation. 
This may also have broader implications in terms of how each sex can 
articulate their specific rights to marriage. If each can not achieve normative 
gender performance for variant reasons their capacity to make political and 
legal arguments for the right marry are likely to diverge as well.
Implications and Conclusions
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While this critical comparison is by no means complete in scope or 
content it can begin a discussion about the role of gender and gender-
based arguments in social movements. The implications of this research 
are both practical and theoretical. In terms of practice, this research shows 
the similarities encountered in the way of gendered arguments in social 
movement and public discourse. Emerging scholarship should take the time 
to expand analysis of these two movements to see how these arguments 
more intricately relate and draw out potential locations of similarities that 
could benefit contemporary movement strategies, both rhetorically and 
organizationally. For example, if women were able to successfully forward 
arguments of expediency without too much damage done to negative images 
of women, then members of the same gay marriage movement would be well 
to find how this rhetoric worked to overcome dominant negative ideologies 
surrounding suffrage. Further, suffragists were able to claim a certain level 
of social responsibility for the appropriate working of the polity. Finding 
similar ground in the gay marriage movement may be the foundation on 
which national right to gay marriage may be won. Finally, a movement 
strategy that has been emulated in the gay marriage debate is the state by 
state securing of gay marriage rights, a strategy that was of service to the 
suffrage movement. The strategic utility for rhetorical productions in this 
respect is that they can be tailored to the particular voting electorate of the 
state in question. The persuasive claims of the gay marriage movement, 
then, can be particularized. However, history here is not all positive. It took 
a national amendment to secure the rights of women to vote, the political 
capital for which the gay marriage movement lacks. Finding and modeling 
some of the national level messages of the suffrage movement may aid that 
advancement of marriage equality in meaningful ways.
While this borrowing is terribly important, it is equally important to 
understand the complicated nature of the gay marriage debate. The gay 
marriage movement’s relationship to the institution to which it seeks entrance 
is vitally different than that of suffragists. While women did not have to 
defend or attack the fundamental qualities of the voting system or democracy 
in general, because gay marriage is seen as threatening the sanctity of the 
institution of marriage, the gay marriage movement faces the added burden 
of deconstructing the iconic construction of marriage. Understanding the 
ideographic nature of marriage makes the arguments from expediency 
that much more important. Conservatives have securely held the ground 
that describes marriage as a sacred religious institution that will only be 
corrupted on account of gays and lesbians. Gay marriage proponents must 
divorce marriage from its current flawless character, but must be careful in 
doing so as to not negate its presumed benefits. The gay marriage movement 
struggles in this respect. Conservative reaction to criticisms of the institution 
of marriage is further protectionism of the institution itself. Commenting on 
divorce rates as evidence of the slipping sanctity of marriage is met with 
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arguments about liberal excess. Ultimately, we find ourselves further shut 
out of such institutions through such strategies.
On a more theoretical level the questions that this research raises are two-
fold: first, how can/should feminists and queers negotiate gender performance, 
not just as normative, but as a moral requirement? Second, does critical gender 
theory have a place in contemporary social movements concerning gender? 
Initially, the analysis above and in the research concerning this topic highlighted 
the religious nature of many arguments. For example, suffrage arguments 
about the appropriate role of women were borne out of religious beliefs about 
God’s role for women. In the gay marriage debate the argument is almost 
completely religious—homosexuality is not natural, not part of God’s plan, 
and an abominable sin. The only way to deduce many of these arguments is 
that the failure to adequately perform the gender that you were assigned by 
nature of your sex is immoral. Femininity and heterosexuality in this sense 
become moral imperatives, not simply socially rewarding. Both Foucault 
(1980) and Butler (1993) discuss social rewards in relation to expected social 
performances. While Butler focuses primarily on gender performance, the 
questions of power and social rewards are articulated clearly in Foucault’s 
discussion of the state. What their conversation of gender performance and 
social reward is missing is the moral expectation of such a performance. In this 
way, those that do not perform their gender appropriately are not only socially 
ostracized, but are religiously condemned—in religious exile with little hope of 
reentrance. Expanding Butler’s discussions of gender performance and social 
benefits to include an analysis of the construction of gender outlaws in relation 
to claims of morality and sin would add to our more complete understanding 
of gender, religion, and all of their intersections.
The second question: does critical gender theory have a place in 
contemporary social movements concerning gender? The answer, of course, 
is exceedingly complicated. While queer theory in general endures criticism 
for its abstract nature, queer theorists who discuss gender performance in 
particular are guilty of a disconnection from the material body. Specifically, 
Butler makes the most complete arguments about gender performance in 
relation to material reality; however, her work is difficult to apply to the 
analysis here. While Butler’s Bodies that matter should ideally readily 
apply to the question of gender performance given her analysis in “Paris 
is Burning,” the actual politics of gender bending in political debates is 
foundationally counterproductive. The religious and moral overtones, as 
well as the control of heteronormative political institutions at the hands of 
conservative men and women poses more than metatheoretical concerns for 
members of the GLBT community who continue to be denied material rights. 
To perform an alternative gender makes them immoral, not liberated in the 
political realm, but to perform their “appropriate” gender and maintain their 
identity is an impossibility. It seems that queer theory as a discipline has failed 
to address this political quandary as it impacts the realities and daily lives 
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of those involved in the gay marriage debate. As such, it is imperative that 
theory meet praxis on this issue. Moving theory from academic institutions 
to the “streets” of the movement would benefit both.
As members of the GLBT community we have much to learn from our 
fore mothers in the suffrage movement. They faced the complicated gender 
related arguments that we ward off daily in our seeking of the right to marry. 
As members of this movement and leaders of more diverse and open society 
that guarantees the natural rights of all people it is imperative that we take 
cues from those who have come before and successfully fought for legislative 
freedom, while simultaneously acknowledging that times and attitudes have 
changed. We must be careful to know that our arguments must become 
more nuanced, more directed, and more persuasive. Instead of making civil 
rights-based arguments, we need to expand these to include social benefits 
arguments. We must shift the debate away from the icon of marriage and 
begin a conversation about how GLBT individuals can add to the benefits 
of marriage. As academics we must be willing to translate our theoretical 
positions into practical activism, and we must be unafraid to make practical 
suggestions to improve the conditions of our realities. Without an effort in 
this direction, the grounds of this debate and those that will take place in the 
future concerning gender, gender performance and legislative/social/political 
equality will always be lost.
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